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I. INTRODUCTION
Volume 9, Number 1, 1985 of the MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTER-
NATIONAL LAW AND TRADE published an article authored by Robert
M. Jarvis, Esq. entitled The Problem of Post-Hearing Delay in Mari-
time Arbitrations: "When Did You Say We Would Receive the Arbi-
trators' Award"?'
Certain propositions put forward by Mr. Jarvis in his discourse are
incontrovertible. Others merit discussion from the perspective of mari-
time arbitrators. A few call for outright refutation.
Mr. Jarvis's treatise focused mainly upon the problem of post-
hearing delay, the lapse of time between receipt by arbitrators of the
parties' final submissions and issuance by those arbitrators of their
awards. He touched only lightly upon the many other factors which
contribute to delay.
Accordingly, the thrust of this presentation is twofold. First, it will
discuss in depth Mr. Jarvis's assertions concerning post-hearing delay.
Second, it will address the many other elements in the arbitral process
which cause or contribute to delay.
1. Jarvis, The Problem of Post-Hearing Delay in Maritime Arbitrations: "When
Did You Say We Would Receive the Arbitrators' Award?", 9 MD. J. INT'L. L. &
TRADE 19 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Jarvis].
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II. DELAY
A. Definitions
1. Unavoidable Delay
Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary defines "delay" as
"hinder for a time."' The causes of arbitral delay assume various
forms. Some of these causes must be accepted because they are una-
voidable. Examples include the temporary unavailability of crucial wit-
nesses, the illness of an arbitrator during or after the proceedings, the
parties' attempts to negotiate a settlement - and very little else!
2. Avoidable Delay
Unless one or both of the parties chooses to cause delay deliber-
ately, or unless the arbitrators do not promptly deliberate and issue
their award, virtually all other causes of delay are avoidable.
B. Consequences of Delay
1. Financial Considerations
Formerly, the financial interest of a claimant in maritime arbitra-
tion was basically protected. (Since arbitrators consistently award in-
terest along with their judgments, the aggrieved party is rendered fi-
nancially whole for the time he spends out-of-pocket while the dispute
is arbitrated.) But this is no longer the case. Serious fiscal difficulties
have plagued the shipping industry for many years, and insolvency has
become commonplace. An award against a bankrupt disputant is obvi-
ously worthless. Accordingly, time is of the essence in today's arbitra-
tions: delay can cause the financial ruin of a party.
In recent years, maritime arbitration procedures have become
more formalized, and therefore, more expensive. An arbitration involv-
ing much witness testimony and many hearings may now be almost as
expensive as a court trial, given the high cost of presenting expert testi-
mony, travel expenses and the time required to complete the proceed-
ings. In addition, arbitrators, who are lawyers or commercial men, ex-
pect the parties to compensate them for their services, while judges do
not.
The desirability of using arbitration as an extrajudicial method of
dispute resolution in maritime circles is constantly juxtaposed with the
desirability of using litigation to resolve disputes. Not too long ago, the
2. WEBSTER'S SEVENTH COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 218 (20th ed. 1972).
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backlog of lawsuits in federal and state courts was a conspicuous disad-
vantage of choosing to litigate. Arbitration became an attractive alter-
native as far as the time factor was concerned. But in recent years the
courts have significantly decreased their backlog and the amount of
time parties must wait before they go to trial. (Perhaps the increased
use of arbitration to resolve disputes has contributed to this improved
state of affairs.) On the other hand, for the reasons discussed herein,
maritime arbitrations have been characterized by an increasing ten-
dency to protract. Now, in some jurisdictions, claimant disputants may
actually prefer to litigate. Thus, the delay common to most arbitrations
reduces the competitiveness of arbitration alongside litigation in the
marketplace.
2. Loss of Confidence
Attorneys and arbitrators must try to revise and improve the pre-
sent system of maritime arbitration if they wish to retain the wavering
confidence of those who now prefer arbitration over litigation, and to
win the confidence of those who may be considering arbitration as a
means of resolving contractual differences.
III. TYPES OF DELAY
A. Party Inspired
Let us first consider the varieties of arbitral delay which flow from
the actions of the parties, specifically in the representation of the par-
ties by their attorneys.
1. Procedural Problems
An arbitration cannot proceed more rapidly than its slowest par-
ticipant does, be it a party, an attorney, or the arbitrators, individually
or collectively. Once a panel has been selected, the panel chairman cus-
tomarily so informs counsel for both disputants and announces the
readiness of the panel to begin the arbitration. Quite often, one or both
parties will request the panel to set a date and hour for an initial hear-
ing. More likely, however, the panel of arbitrators will hear nothing
from the parties for weeks, months, even years. This is a normal and
acceptable procedure when one of the disputants has simply requested
arbitration as a means of leverage in ongoing settlement discussions.
But unfortunately, this is not always the case.
Frequently, the parties are at an irreconcilable impasse when arbi-
tration is initiated. The unnecessary passage of time without activity
from counsel for the parties often occurs because the claimant does not
DELAY - AN ARBITRATOR'S VIEW
have his case in a state appropriate for presentation. This can be due to
the unavailability of key witnesses in the immediate future (a frequent
problem when shipboard personnel are involved) or it may be the result
of the time-consuming difficulties associated with obtaining documenta-
tion from clients, particularly those domiciled abroad. Of course, a con-
scientious attorney must await receipt from his client of everything he
considers essential to the success of his presentation in the arbitration.
The panel, in turn, must wait until the parties are ready to proceed. An
able panel chairman will periodically press the parties for their state of
preparedness for the initial hearing.
2. Adjournments
For any dispute requiring more than one hearing, which is usually
the case, future hearings must be scheduled at the initial hearing. Cus-
tomarily, one or more further hearings are firmed up anywhere from
days or even months down the road, and everyone scrupulously enters
them into their personal calendars. Nevertheless, with what appears to
be increasing regularity, counsel for the parties request adjournment.
We will examine here those requests made by counsel for the parties.
Sometimes a witness scheduled to appear on a certain date is sud-
denly not available for that hearing. Because he had nothing else pre-
pared for that hearing, counsel requests an adjournment and the reset-
ting of a date. This is not an unreasonable request for it was inspired
by a matter beyond the attorney's control; the consequences, however,
are usually most unfortunate. If the cancellation of the hearing has
occurred on short notice, one can expect considerable delay in
rescheduling the adjourned hearing on a date open to all three arbitra-
tors, counsel for the parties, and their witnesses. Arbitration panels are
sometimes asked for adjournments because the attorney dealing with
the dispute is called to trial, with the same inexpedient result.
3. Overloading Arbitrators
In his presentation, Mr. Jarvis points almost diagrammatically to
the recognized reality that a relatively small group of practicing arbi-
trators are asked to arbitrate much more frequently than the others
who are qualified and available within and outside the Society of Mari-
time Arbitrators, Inc. (S.M.A.). 8 This burdening of a few is now the
primary cause of delay on the maritime arbitral scene in New York.
Even though in recent years a number of formerly ayocation arbitrators
3. Jarvis, supra note 1, at 35.
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have become available on a full-time basis, the problem of disputants
consistently appointing the same arbitrators over and over again has
not disappeared.
Arbitrators have no control over this situation, except to the extent
that they can voluntarily decline appointments; the parties and their
attorneys, who decide whom to select, do have control over it. On many
occasions over the years I have discussed this aspect of maritime arbi-
tration with admiralty attorneys at both personal and professional
levels. I understand that they want to attain the best possible chance of
success for their clients. But my experience as an arbitrator for some
twenty-five years suggests that they should appoint less prestigious but
equally competent arbitrators in order to alleviate the current problem
of delay and its disagreeable consequences. Long-term benefits accrue
when many qualified individuals are allowed to gain actual arbitral ex-
perience. The busiest of our maritime arbitrators are now also the old-
est. Age may bring wisdom, but it also brings retirement. Concentra-
tion of the bulk of arbitral activity in the hands of the oldest arbitrators
does not allow those who someday must assume their burdens to ac-
quire any experience. Parties and their counsel ought to avail them-
selves of the many qualified young individuals, particularly within the
S.M.A., who can arbitrate.
4. Unnecessary Testimony
Traditionally, one of the advantages of maritime arbitration was
the simplicity of the proceedings in comparison with what is to be ex-
pected from a courtroom trial. Witnesses at arbitrations used to testify
only about facts. Occasionally, expert testimony was required for areas
outside the normal expertise of commercial men in the maritime trades.
Now, however, there is a trend for disputants unnecessarily to bring
witnesses before arbitral panels to testify about matters which have
been or will be established by available documentation. And where ex-
pert witnesses are concerned, we often encounter "can you top this"
presentations of rebuttal witnesses - almost ad infinitum. Counsel is
entitled to leave no stone unturned in the diligent defense of a client's
interests, but sometimes they call too many witnesses. Such excessive-
ness contributes to the delay and expense of the proceeding.
Quite frequently, a witness on direct examination is asked ques-
tions which waste considerable time and which are almost presumptu-
ous because they assume one or all of the arbitrators is totally ignorant
of the subject matter. When this happens, time is lost and cost is in-
creased, unnecessarily.
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5. Protracted Witness Examination
Certain attorneys do not know when to stop questioning a witness,
especially when cross-examining. Often this is because the witness has
come from abroad and may not be available for further testimony later.
At other times the record is unnecessarily burdened simply because the
attorney does not recognize that the witness has nothing further to con-
tribute to developing the facts of the dispute. Here again, cumulative
testimony wastes time and money.
6. Brief Overkill
Briefs are an integral part of the arbitral process. They synthesize
the sometimes voluminous written and oral submissions before the
panel. The legal and arbitral precedents cited in briefs are useful to
arbitrators who have not been schooled in the law - i.e., virtually all
commercial men. Reply briefs, when requested, respond to perspectives
and arguments contained in the main briefs of opposing counsel. A
well-considered and organized brief is a powerful tool in the hands of
the experienced attorney. Unfortunately, as the years go by, the briefs
become longer and longer, even when the issues are not overly complex.
The unfavorable consequence of superfluous briefs is the additional
time required for attorneys to write them and for arbitrators to read
them; this translates into another reason for delay.
7. Excessive Documentation
Much of the documentation submitted in an arbitration is clearly
necessary for the presentation of claims and defenses. Some of it is not.
Often, important, even critical, documents are submerged in a flood of
essentially irrelevant paper which arbitrators must wade through to en-
sure that they overlook nothing of consequence. Again additional time
is required, causing further delay and expense.
8. Shunning the Sole Arbitrator
Only very occasionally is a sole arbitrator asked to dispose of a
maritime dispute in New York, and this is most unfortunate. Since
each of the three arbitrators in our tripartite system is supposedly unbi-
ased toward the party appointing him, one wonders why more parties
don't use the efficient and economical sole arbitrator more frequently.
Certainly disputes involving modest amounts call for a sole arbitrator
rather than a full-blown tripartite panel. The parties could save a lot of
time and money if they used a sole arbitrator when appropriate.
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9. Dilatory Briefing
Occasionally, over a year elapses between the closing of hearings
and the submission of briefs - even when the panels pressure counsel
to complete and present their briefs. Because arbitrators do not prepare
to deliberate until briefs are in hand, they have a difficult time associat-
ing the written final arguments with the faces of those who testified and
remembering the events of the proceedings themselves. In such circum-
stances, it sometimes becomes necessary to review the usually volumi-
nous transcripts. Counsel's dilatoriness in submitting briefs thus creates
additional delay in the adjudication of the dispute.
10. Unfounded Appeals
Attorneys, perhaps unwittingly, give arbitration a bad name in an-
other way. Although an unsuccessful appeal of an award by a losing
party has no effect upon the pattern of delay of an individual arbitra-
tion, it does affect the overall reputation of arbitration for dispute reso-
lution when compared to litigation. This is true not only in New York,
but also in London where rights of appeal of arbitral awards exist by
statute4 and the losing party frequently appeals. The legitimate
grounds for requesting that an award be vacated5 are very narrow and
limited, and overturns of arbitration decisions have been few and far
between. Nonetheless, many unsuccessful disputants try to vacate
awards on well-trampled grounds which have never before succeeded.
The author has no intention of telling attorneys how to run their show,
but he suggests that repeated appeals of arbitration awards on obvi-
ously specious grounds hurt the image of arbitration in its competitive
status with litigation. When this happens, the interests of both arbitra-
tors and admiralty attorneys are adversely affected.
B. Arbitrator Induced
1. Procedural Problems
Arbitrators contribute to delays in the arbitral process by request-
ing the parties and co-arbitrators for adjournments. They do this be-
cause of illness or overriding personal considerations, including unantic-
ipated business demands. But it is the author's experience that
4. Arbitration Act, 1950, 14 Geo. 6, ch. 27, amended by ch. 3, 1975 and ch. 42,
1979.
5. 9 U.S.C. §10 (1982). 9 U.S.C. §11 (1982) provides for the modification or correc-
tion of arbitral awards.
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arbitrator-induced hearing adjournments delay arbitrations only rarely.
2. Immoderate Acceptance of Appointments
In his study of post-hearing arbitral delay, Mr. Jarvis points to the
rather obvious fact that a relatively small group of individuals continue
to share most of the maritime arbitration appointments in New York.6
His analysis of the awards issued during 1984 highlighted the fact that
seven arbitrators, all commercial men and members of the S.M.A., oc-
cupied 156 of the 325 slots created by Ill arbitrations.7 The significance
of his statistics, however, is neither as conclusive nor as simple as it
superficially appears. In these financially difficult times for shipping,
many unopposed arbitrations are initiated and many unopposed awards
are issued. Such awards are normally rendered fairly quickly because
there is often no hearing and they require relatively little expenditure
of time and effort on the part of the arbitrators involved. Mr. Jarvis's
statistics include many awards of this type. Second, many of the 325
awards published in 1984 were the culmination of perhaps years of
prior effort which just happened to be concluded during 1984. In such
instances, analyzing award releases in a specific year does not accu-
rately measure the extent of the activity of a particular arbitrator.
Therefore, a purely numerical analysis of awards can be deceptive inso-
far as the participation of individuals in maritime arbitration in a given
year is concerned.
Mr. Jarvis defined "arbitral overcommitment" as the acceptance
by both full-time and part-time arbitrators of more appointments than
they can schedule adequately.8 Full-time arbitrators, (i.e., those of us
who no longer have industry employers or who have elected to become
available as full-time arbitrators in favor of self-employment within the
trade) are increasing in number. The number of arbitrators in this cat-
egory will probably increase even more in the near future. Full-time
arbitrators, whether or not they depend on the compensation to be de-
rived from arbitration, should not be required to examine more closely
their available time before they accept appointments, as Mr. Jarvis
suggested they should.9 On the contrary, their full-time availability, a
relatively new phenomenon, makes it possible for the more complex and
time-consuming disputes to be resolved in a more orderly fashion. For
example, parties can take advantage of the full-time availability of ar-
6. Jarvis, supra note 1, at 35.
7. id.
8. Id. at 39.
9. Id. at 56-57.
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bitrators to have consecutive, full days of testimony. This allows claim-
ants and respondents to present their claims and defenses quickly, with-
out the protracted hearing-to-hearing procedures part-time arbitrators
provide. Part-time arbitrators are usually only available to arbitrate
when they skip lunch or work late. Thus, the full-time arbitrator has an
advantage over the part-time arbitrator when it comes to the schedul-
ing of hearings. Excessive delay in arbitrations conducted before full-
time maritime arbitrators should no longer be a problem, as long as the
many part-time arbitrators are still available for appointments.
This does not necessarily hold true for industry-employed mari-
time arbitrators who now share the bulk of arbitral appointments and
who will continue to do so. Here, the possibility of overcommitment
undeniably exists, but only among a handful of persons who are blessed
not only with the considerable talent which has secured them their po-
sitions and reputations, but also with the experience and skills which
make them attractive to disputants. Because these popular individuals
have only non-working hours available for arbitrating, their schedules
are tight and their appointment books are always full. This article has
already mentioned the ability of parties and their counsel to reduce the
delay which results from the appointment of already overbooked arbi-
trators.10 It would be inappropriate and certainly injudicious for this
author to comment upon the desirability of such individuals exercising
self-discipline.
3. Inappropriate Chairman Selection
In the typical maritime arbitration, the chairman plays a critical
role in many respects totally independent of the fact that he is the
choice of the party-appointed arbitrators to serve as the "third man,"
the inherent "swing" vote in the event that he does not reach the same
conclusions in whole or in part of his colleagues. A maritime arbitra-
tion chairman also bears the responsibility of representing the collective
interests of the panel before the parties in the arbitration. This in-
cludes, among other things, scheduling hearings, confirming the sched-
ule in writing, coping with procedural matters between hearings, and
acting as spokesman for the panel during hearings. The extent of the
chairman's experience in handling these matters directly affects the
pace of the proceedings. The seasoned chairman rides close herd on the
parties and assesses their state of preparedness at the initial hearing.
Thereafter, he schedules further hearings as promptly as possible. An
able chairman recognizes that the panel has inherent statutory powers
10. See supra at -.
DELAY - AN ARBITRATOR'S VIEW
to expedite arbitration procedures,"' and he exercises them when the
parties start dragging their feet.
Since the actions of the panel's chairman can greatly influence the
pace of the proceedings, it is of singular importance that when the ap-
pointed arbitrators choose the chairman, they take into consideration
not only the particular expertise he can contribute to an evaluation of
the dispute, but also his ability to represent the panel as chairman. This
is particularly so when the dispute is expected to be complex, or when
it involves a substantial sum of money. Although acquainting arbitra-
tors with details of the dispute prior to the composition and acceptance
of the panel is not allowed, the panel generally has an inkling before-
hand of the substance of the controversy. Sometimes, the chairman is
quite knowledgeable in the area of the dispute but either he has little or
no chairmanship experience, or he is just not cut out for that role. Such
a chairmanship appointment only invites delay. Appointed arbitrators
have a responsibility to the parties to elect a chairman who can cope
with the procedural needs of the adjudication. They can help to de-
crease delay by choosing an able panel chairman.
C. Post-hearing Delay
Unfortunately, post-hearing delay exists. Arbitrators, however, can
work to decrease this type of delay.
1. Failure to Schedule Deliberation Promptly
The primary cause of post-hearing, or "post-briefing," delay is the
failure of the arbitrators to schedule promptly a time to deliberate.
They can make no progress toward the release of the award until they
agree when and where they will convene to share their views and con-
clusions. Once a date for this procedure has been established, the arbi-
trators have a deadline to aim for in their preparations for the delibera-
tion. Absent this fundamental step, the award will indefinitely be in a
state of abeyance.
Eliminating this type of post-briefing delay is within the sole con-
trol of the arbitrators. Although scheduling the date of deliberation is a
collective responsibility, the chairman, as part of his procedural respon-
sibilities, should stay on top of the situation and do whatever is neces-
sary to do it. This is very simple. Once the briefs have been received
from the parties (including reply briefs if they have been requested), he
should immediately establish the deliberation date. Even the busiest of
11. 9 U.S.C. §7 (1982).
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arbitrators has open dates available for deliberation, although it might
be some six weeks hence. Once the deliberation date is set, one cause of
post-briefing delay is eliminated.
Only rarely, in instances of highly complex disputes, is more than
a single deliberation required. Areas of thought and conclusion not to-
tally resolved during the deliberation may have to be addresed in the
draft stages of the award, but the arbitrators have taken a big step
toward the release of the award once they have deliberated.
2. Award Writing
The writing of the award following deliberation is a conspicuous
culprit of post-briefing delay, and it is within the control of the
arbitrators.
A number of factors can influence the progress of completion of
the award once the panel has ended its deliberations. Traditionally, the
chairman composes an initial draft which is circulated to the other
panel members for their corrections and suggested modifications. Fail-
ure of the chairman to submit his draft to his colleagues within a rea-
sonable time after deliberation happens with disturbing frequency. The
only means of rectifying this situation is for one or both of the other
panel members to monitor the progress (or lack of it) of the chairman
in providing the draft and to prod him to greater efforts when neces-
sary. In the extreme cases when the chairman fails to write this initial
draft, the other panel members have drafted the award and submitted
it to him for consideration. Writing the award and issuing it in a timely
fashion to the parties is the individual and collective obligation of the
entire tribunal.
Another solution to the award writing delay problem is for the
panel to divide the writing of the three basic components of the award
(facts, arguments, and decision and discussion) among the tribunal.
This method is often quite effective because panel members of more
advanced legal background can write the parts of the award dealing
with the law; technically-oriented arbitrators can write about the tech-
nical material; and those who by occupation are knowledgeable about
damages can explain the damages which may be granted as part of an
arbitral award. A concerted effort on the part of all the arbitrators will
decrease the time lag between the submission of the briefs and issuance
of the award.
Mr. Jarvis and others have suggested that the fully reasoned
award be either altogether dispensed with, or limited in scope.1 2 One of
12. Jarvis, supra note 1, at 58.
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the more important distinctions between the way maritime arbitration
is practiced in New York and the way it is done in other jurisdictions,
notably London, is New York's tradition of including within the awards
the reasons for the conclusions. The maritime bar has tacitly, and at
times expressly, approved New York's practice of issuing reasoned
awards. The reasoned awards create a body of law which one can read-
ily research through the S.M.A.'s Award Service or through the
LEXIS computerized library. Although there is something to be said
for brevity and conciseness of awards, issuing reasoned awards is desir-
able and beneficial to parties, their attorneys and even arbitrators
themselves. Adjudicators benefit from understanding the reasoning
from which conclusions have been drawn. It is also important to the
arbitral system that the whys and wherefores of arbitrators' decisions
become part of a written public record.
IV. RESOLVING THE PROBLEMS
A. Party Attributable
1. Broader Distribution of Appointments
Arbitrators have neither direct nor indirect control over whether
they are appointed. Parties and their attorneys decide whom to appoint,
and they should refrain from appointing the popular arbitrators over
and over again. This will allow other competent, available individuals
to move up the arbitration ladder.
2. Procedural Alternatives
Streamlining arbitration hearing procedures would shorten the ar-
bitral process. Relevant documentation could replace the redundant
testimony of some fact witnesses. The panel could forbid counsel to
present unnecessary expert witnesses. It could even dispense with the
formal arbitration hearing. Could not a written exchange of claims and
counterclaims (and supporting documentation) replace the hearing?
And are briefs really necessary? Are not the issues so narrow, well-
defined, and easily understood that oral argument alone enables the
panel to understand the controversy and to proceed to deliberation
without formal briefs? If briefs are necessary, could they not be in the
form of informal letters to the arbitrators? The ways to simplify arbi-
tration procedures, and therefore reduce delay and expense, are many.
3. Toward Conciseness
Briefs should help, not confuse, the arbitrators. Citing a lot of
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cases which are not on point overwhelms the arbitrators and confuses
the issues. Court decisions handed down in 1896 usually bear no rela-
tionship to the facts of today's cases which involve contemporary com-
mercial maritime activity. They are of little or no practical assistance
to arbitrators. Looking up these irrelevant citations wastes the arbitra-
tors' time and contributes to delay.
4. Sole Arbitrators
Only two to three percent of maritime arbitrations in New York
take place before a sole arbitrator. Using a sole arbitrator is probably
the best way to obtain an award quickly and relatively inexpensively.
The reason the maritime bar gives for not using a sole arbitrator is
frequently the parties' inability to agree on one. Waiving the privilege
of appointing an arbitrator in favor of agreeing upon a sole arbitrator
supposedly prejudices the client's interests. This is simply not the case.
After all, the parties have no control over the election of the third arbi-
trator, the chairman. Would they not sometimes be just as well off if
they agreed upon a competent and neutral sole arbitrator? This is par-
ticularly true in disputes where the amounts at stake are modest, i.e.,
not exceeding $50,000. In such circumstances, it is almost extravagant,
in terms of time and cost, to go the tripartite route. Admittedly, using
a sole arbitrator requires a modicum of cooperation between the par-
ties, to say the least. Regrettably, maritime arbitration has not particu-
larly distinguished itself in that regard.
5. Pinch Hitters
The final area of delay to which the parties contribute is their re-
peated requests for adjournments of scheduled hearings because coun-
sel is suddenly unavailable for some reason. Almost invariably, when
the panel chairman suggests that another member of the firm substi-
tute for him, the party responds that no one else is familiar with the
case or with the activity planned for that hearing. This sometimes hap-
pens even when two or more partners have worked on the case. Attor-
neys should be more willing to substitute for one another.
B. Arbitrator Occasioned
1. Appointment Self-Discipline
It is well-known that a relatively small group of arbitrators domi-
nate the New York and London maritime arbitral scenes. Because ar-
bitrators serve only by appointment by the parties or as third arbitra-
tors upon the agreement of the appointed ones, these very busy
DELAY - AN ARBITRATOR'S VIEW
arbitrators, both full-time and industry-employed, feel that the delays
stemming from their overcommitment are not their fault; after all, they
have no control over the appointments. Of course extremely popular
arbitrators could exercise a degree of self-restraint and not accept more
appointments when their calendars are such that the additional cases
would inevitably suffer delay.
2. The 120-Day Limit
The S.M.A. has recently taken a significant positive step by ad-
dressing the problem of post-hearing delay which Mr. Jarvis discussed
in his treatise. On December 9, 1986, the S.M.A. announced that it
had amended Section 27 of its Rules: arbitrators must render an award
within 120 days of receipt of the final submissions of the parties."3 An
earlier directive had firmly recommended to the membership that a de-
liberation date be scheduled immediately following receipt by the panel
members of parties' final submissions." Additionally, the party-ap-
pointed arbitrators can decrease delay only by selecting a qualified
panel chairman."
V. RESPONDING To THE "JARVIS" REPORT
A. Proposed Rules
As part of his report, Mr. Jarvis proposed a rule (which presuma-
bly could only be promulgated as part of the S.M.A. Rules) which
would require an arbitrator, at the time he discloses his possible biases
to the parties, counsel, and fellow arbitrators, also to disclose the
amount of time he will be able to devote to that arbitration.' 6 If the
party who did not choose that arbitrator feels that the arbitrator will
not be able to decide the matter in a timely fashion, that party may
demand that the appointing party select a new arbitrator. Up to three
such challenges would be permitted; further challenges would be al-
lowed if leave from the court is obtained.
13. Section 27 of the S.M.A. Rules of September 15, 1984 now reads as follows:
"Time. It is the obligation of the Panel to issue its Award promptly after the last
evidence or brief has been received from the parties, but not later than 120 days there-
from. The onus of implementation of this goal shall be on the Chairman unless disabil-
ity prevents his accomplishing it, in which case the other panel members shall take
necessary steps to meet the desired time limit. Failure of the Panel to abide by this
provision shall not be grounds for challenge of the Award."
14. See Appendix.
15. See supra at -.
16. Jarvis, supra note I, at 57.
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The above proposal is totally unfeasible for a number of reasons.
First, prior to the formal constitution of the panel, parties may disclose
to arbitrators only the general nature of the dispute and the identities
of all the parties and their counsel. It is impossible to tell from such
limited information the complexity of a dispute and the amount of time
which will be required to hear and adjudicate it. Further, not only does
allowing parties to challenge arbitrators on any grounds other than
those already established by statute and tradition invite procedural
abuse, but it also introduces an element of courtroom legality which
commercial arbitration was created to avoid.
B. Written Opinions
Mr. Jarvis has also proposed that "written opinions" (by which
term I assume he means the inclusion by arbitrators of their reasoning
processes within their awards) be dispensed with, unless both parties
agree otherwise. 17 This author suggests that the majority of maritime
attorneys now engaged in arbitration would object to abolishing "rea-
soned" awards. The library of over 2,200 awards, available through the
S.M.A. Award Service, indexed by a digest, and also accessible
through LEXIS, is a valuable tool when attorneys advise clients and
evaluate their disputes. Reasoned awards are essential to the well-being
of the entire maritime arbitral system. Furthermore, these reasoned
awards induce disputants to arbitrate in New York rather than in
London and elsewhere.
C. Time Limits
Mr. Jarvis has also suggested a strictly enforced time limit of
forty-five days within which awards must be issued after the submission
of briefs, unless the parties agree to a longer or shorter period of
time.18 If the parties require a written opinion, ninety days would be
allowed. Arbitrators would not be permitted to request extensions of
time. The dire consequences of an award not being released within the
imposed time limitations have not been recognized. These consequences
are that the award can be vacated upon the application of the losing
party, thereby causing a senseless waste of time, effort, and money.
When the S.M.A. Board of Governors chose to recommend a vol-
untary 120-day limitation for award issuance, it assumed that arbitra-
tors would be able to complete their deliberations, write the award, and
17. Id. at 58.
18. Id. at 57.
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render it within that period of time. This depends upon the integrity
and ability of arbitrators to adjust their schedules and priorities accord-
ing to the dictates of this time constraint. Additionally, this is a volun-
tary action, rather than a mandatory one, as Mr. Jarvis would have
it."' Once it becomes apparent that a particular arbitration is of suffi-
cient complexity to require more than 120 days, the panel has the flexi-
bility to modify the time limit under the existing S.M.A. procedure.
D. "Expedited Arbitration"
Mr. Jarvis refers to "Expedited Arbitration," 0 a procedure under
which the arbitrators would be required to render their decisions within
one week of the close of hearings. This possibility already exists when-
ever both parties desire a prompt (or even immediate) decision, and
cooperate in the obtaining of it. Many maritime arbitrations over the
years have been resolved swiftly. In such cases, arbitrators make the
decision on the spot and sometimes issue a brief written opinion, which
is often followed up by an option with a more elaborate analysis. A
panel will virtually always be able to service the disputants' need to
resolve their problems immediately as long as the parties cooperate.
Mr. Jarvis accepts that contracting parties are not likely to con-
sider his new procedural changes as part of the arbitration clause when
they negotiate their contracts.2 He suggests, therefore, that legislative
action by national governments or arbitral bodies will solve the delay
problem. 2 I respectfully submit that maritime arbitration here and
abroad has functioned effectively for longer than most of us even re-
motely involved in it can remember. One of the reasons it has operated
successfully is its ability to function outside (but alongside) the judicial
systems, without unnecessary interference by the courts. In any event,
the courts have consistently interpreted the Federal Arbitration Act"
as having created a dispute resolution process to be left alone by the
judiciary. The courts will simply not interfere unless there are obvious
violations of the extremely narrow provisions of Sections 10 and 11 of the
Act. It is not likely that either legislators or the judiciary would now
consider modifying the statutory position of arbitration or its unique
relationship with court procedures.
Finally, Mr. Jarvis proposes a rule whereunder the doctrine of the
19. Id.
20. Id. at 58.
21. Id. at 61.
22. Id.
23. 9 U.S.C. §§1-14 (1982).
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immunity of arbitrators from personal liability (derived from judicial
immunity) would be waived, and arbitrators failing to meet a stipu-
lated time limit for award issuance would become personally liable for
all damages suffered by either party which are the consequences of the
late award.14 Once commercial arbitrators are required to assume per-
sonal liability for any aspect of arbitrating, they will no longer
arbitrate.
VI. THE ROLE OF THE PARTIAL FINAL AWARD
Finally, I would briefly like to update Mr. Jarvis's observations
about Partial Final Awards." Partial Final Awards have attracted con-
siderable attention from the courts in recent years. On May 19, 1986,
the Second Circuit affirmed the granting of a Partial Final Award to
the owners of the CAPTAIN CONSTANTE. 2 6 It would thus appear
that such awards are sustainable when a severable issue conforms with
established minimum fundamental requirements. On the other hand,
experienced arbitrators are reluctant to respond to a request by a party
for a Partial Final Award (the granting of which is exclusively within
the discretion of the arbitrators) unless it is necessary to remedy a
clearly obvious and illegal withholding of freight. Absent such pressure,
there is a distinct tendency on the part of some arbitrators to prefer to
hear and decide all the issues at the same time, rather than fragment
the proceedings.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
A variety of causes of delay have been apparent for some time in
maritime commercial arbitration. Some are avoidable; others are not.
Delay tarnishes the image of arbitration as a desirable alternative to
litigation for dispute resolution. It sometimes even causes substantial
financial loss to a party who has won the arbitration: the party finds its
award unenforceable because the losing party has experienced financial
hardship during the period of delay.
By modifying their procedures, practicing attorneys could signifi-
cantly reduce delay in arbitration. This would involve fewer requests
for adjournments, a broader distribution of arbitration appointments, a
more pragmatic approach to testimony and the examination of wit-
nesses, more concise briefs, letter briefs in lieu of formal briefs when
24. Jarvis, supra note 1, at 57.
25. Id. at 51-53.
26. 790 F.2d 280 (2d Cir. 1986).
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the former will suffice, a reduction of extraneous documentation, and
more frequent use of a sole arbitrator rather than an entire panel.
Arbitrators could contribute to quicker resolution of disputes by
exercising self-restraint in acceptance of appointments as dictated by
circumstances, agreeing upon panel chairmen who can and will move
the proceedings along, and deliberating and issuing their awards within
reasonable and acceptable time parameters. The recent 120-day direc-
tive from the S.M.A. Board of Governors to its membership should no-
ticeably reduce arbitrator-induced delay.
Mr. Jarvis's suggestions for dealing with post-hearing delay, in the
form of the proposed rules which would reduce post-hearing delays,
2 7
are neither reasonable nor practicable. Permitting what are virtually
peremptory challenges by attorneys of the fitness of individual arbitra-
tors to serve because of their alleged lack of available time, would in-
troduce a formal courtroom atmosphere into arbitration proceedings.
Allowing arbitrators only forty-five days within which to render an
award is unreasonable, and will result in the vacating of awards when
compliance with the time limit inevitably becomes impossible. Legisla-
tion stripping arbitrators of their immunity from personal liability will
not expedite the issuance of awards - it will only limit the number of
available arbitrators. No rational arbitrator would risk incurring such
liability. Dispensing with reasoned opinions in arbitration awards as a
means of accelerating the release of the award is also undesirable.
These opinions are heavily relied upon by attorneys who counsel
disputants.
Finally, Partial Final Awards are permissible in certain circum-
stances, and are useful when freights are withheld without justification.
But their usefulness for other reasons is questionable in the minds of
many arbitrators.
27. Jarvis, supra note 1, at 56-58.
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APPENDIX
The President of the S.M.A. sent the following letter.
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SOCIETY OF MARITIME ARBITRATORS, INC.
26 Broadway - Suite 1200
New York, N.Y. 10004
212-483-0616
Telex: RCA 232723
ITT 421814
WU 126724
March 14, 1986
TO: THE MEMBERSHIP, SOCIETY OF MARITIME ARBITRATORS, INC.
FROM: CHARLES F. NISI, PRESIDENT
RE: DELAYS IN ISSUANCE OF AWARDS SUBSEQUENT TO BRIEFING
Over recent months I have addressed letters to the Membership on the
subject of urgent necessity for reduction in the lamentable delays which
have been occurring from date of receipt by panels of final submissions
from the parties until issuance of the awards.
Continuing open criticism on this issue from the maritime bar and
from users of the New York Maritime arbitral system both domestic
and abroad caused your Board of Governors to conscientiously consider
the implications of the problem at its meeting on March 11. Following
is the unanimous consensus and directive of the Board pertaining to
this aspect of arbitral delay:
1. The Board recognized and affirmed it is the obligation of all
S.M.A. members to render their awards in a timely manner. Over the
years, merchants have looked favorably upon resolution of their mari-
time disputes in New York because of rapidity of decision with accom-
panying relatively low cost alongside litigation.
2. The Board as your representative is firmly of the opinion the
time has come to monitor and take necessary action in an area in which
New York Maritime Arbitrators, including S.M.A. Members, exercise
control - the parameters of time within which awards are released
following completion of briefing by counsel for the parties. If New
York Maritime Arbitrators are to continue to contribute to the needs of
our industry, we must produce acceptable results within the briefest
possible span.
3. In conformity with this objective, the Board directs its Member-
ship to limit the period within which awards are to be rendered to a
maximum of 120 days from the date of final submissions by the parties.
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When the Rules were last amended in 1983 the 90 day proviso was in
retrospect unfortunately dispensed with. Reinstatement of 120 days is
designed to permit some flexibility to those arbitrators encountering
other urgent and unanticipated commitments which may temporarily
interfere with completion of the award. Society Members who may be
overburdened with heavy arbitration schedules and/or unavoidable bus-
iness commitments may wish to consider declining new appointments to
enable compliance with the intent of this directive.
4. As soon as practicable the existing Rules will be amended to in-
clude the 120 day stipulation. Acceptance of S.M.A. Rules by the par-
ties will automatically trigger the 120 day limitation. Meantime, it is
mandated by the Board that all S.M.A. Members voluntarily confirm
on the record at the initial hearing of an arbitration their joint agree-
ment to issuance of their award within 120 days of receipt of final sub-
missions, with the only acceptable grounds for a request by the Panel
for extension of time being physical disability or other events definable
as Force Majeure category.
5. For the present and even after the Rules have been amended
with the 120 day proviso, there will be situations involving tripartite
Panels where our Members may be sitting with non S.M.A. Commer-
cial Men and/or Members of the Bar. It will be incumbent upon our
Members to in such situations do their best to institute the 120 day-
time limitation for the proceeding.
6. It is intended the Code of Ethics of our Society also be amended
to specifically stipulate violation of the 120 day limitation will be con-
sidered a breach of the Code. Until then, Members should bear in mind
failure to observe this considered directive of the Board may subject
transgressors to proceedings before the Ethics Committee.
For all of us involved in the arbitral process - arbitrators, attorneys,
businessmen who use the system, the continuing goal must be upgrad-
ing of the quality of the service provided on the New York scene. If
arbitration in New York is to remain competitive with existing interna-
tional centers and others around the world eager to enter the arbitra-
tion market we must immediately and positively respond to widespread
allegations of delay with which we are presently confronted, within an
area where a degree of self-disciplinary control can and must be exer-
cised. We are hopeful this seriously considered action will not alone
contribute to the improvement of New York's image in Maritime Arbi-
tration. Perhaps its fallout will extend to those areas of delay in Mari-
time Arbitration over which arbitrators themselves have no direct
control.
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Your attention and compliance with the above is warmly and earnestly
requested.
CHARLES F. NISI,
President
